Jean-Jacques Rousseau devoted an important chapter of his Social Contract to the dictatorship. Carl Schmitt interpreted Rousseau’s chapter as marking the transition from ‘commissarial’ to ‘sovereign dictatorship’. This article argues that Schmitt’s interpretation is historically and conceptually inaccurate. Instead of paving the way for sovereign dictatorship, Rousseau carefully distinguished the dictatorship from the people’s sovereign authority. Taking position in the ‘debate’ between Bodin and Grotius on the relation between dictatorship and sovereignty, he argued that the dictator could provisionally suspend the (...) people’s sovereign authority, but not abolish it. More particularly, the dictator did not possess the power to make generally binding laws, which had to remain the exclusive authority of the popular assembly. However, this did not prevent Rousseau from recognizing the dictatorship as a means for democratic reform. Rousseau thus conceived of the dictatorship as a time-limited and revocable commission to protect the constitution and to provide for a more stable and effective state organization based on the principle of popular sovereignty. (shrink)

On 9 December 1930, Walter Benjamin sent a copy of his book The Origin of German Tragic Drama to Carl Schmitt, accompanied by a letter in which he expressed his indebtedness to Schmitt: "You will very quickly recognize how much my book is indebted to you for its presentation of the doctrine of sovereignty in the seventeenth century. Perhaps I may say, in addition, that I have also derived from your later works, especially Die Diktatur, a confirmation of my modes (...) of research in the philosophy of art from yours in the philosophy of the state. If the reading of my book allows this feeling to emerge in an intelligible fashion, then the purpose of my sending it to you will be achieved" (qtd. in Weber 1992, 5). As .. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article seeks to explain why the Roman dictatorship, which had served as a positive model of constitutional emergency government until the French Revolution, acquired a negative meaning during the Revolution itself. Both Montesquieu and Rousseau regarded the dictatorship as a legitimate institution, necessary to protect the republic in times of crisis. For the French revolutionaries, the word ‘dictatorship’ acquired negative connotations: it became a rhetorical tool for accusing their political opponents of authoritarian rule. This article argues that Carl (...) Schmitt’s distinction between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship is unhelpful for understanding why the dictatorship was rejected by the French revolutionaries. Instead, it shows that it was the early identification with Montesquieu’s aristocratic dictatorship, which caused the delegates of the National Assembly to reject it as a threat to popular sovereignty. The exception was Marat, who proposed to establish a popular dictatorship à la Rousseau to purge the state from counterrevolutionary forces. However, Marat’s proposal found little support with his fellow-Jacobins, as it allowed the Girondins to accuse them of a conspiracy against the Convention. This caused the Jacobins to reject the dictatorship altogether and to propose alternative models of emergency government. (shrink)

This article seeks to explain how it was possible that, until the first century BC, the Roman dictatorship was never abused and turned against the constitution itself. The traditional explanation is that, contrary to its first century imitations, the dictatorship was subject to formal restrictions, such as the six months' tenure, which were strictly applied. By contrast, this article suggests that informal constraints on the dictator's powers, such as moral and religious norms, were as important as formal constraints. It shows, (...) more particularly, how the fides, or the requirement of trust, was essential for preventing an abuse of dictatorial powers. (shrink)